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 Freeing Energy from Carbon
 The doing of more with less attests to the practical ad
 vancement of societies. In fact, labor, capital, and inputs
 of other factors to the economy have demonstrably de
 creased per unit of output and value added since the beginnings of
 the industrial revolution some two hundred years ago. These in
 creases in the productivity of resources owe to numerous technical
 and organizational innovations and to an enormous accumulation
 of knowledge and experience.
 A portion of the increases in productivity is attributable simply
 to the increasing scale of activities, also made possible by technical
 and organizational innovations. Often with greater size, cost de
 creases and efficiency increases within specific frames. For ex
 ample, in building electricity-generating plants a long-standing
 rule of thumb was that the cost of the plant would grow with two
 thirds the power of its size. We are uncertain now where we stand
 with respect to optimal scale of many facilities and systems, but it
 seems likely that considerable opportunities to lift efficiency re
 main.
 Perhaps more important than simply size and more certain to
 continue yielding productivity gains is the accumulation of knowl
 edge and experience. Growth in output in an economic system
 with suitable incentives tends to bring positive returns of its own.
 This process is sometimes referred to as "learning by doing."
 Analysis of learning curves in a range of industries, beginning with
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 the manufacture of aircraft, has provided ample evidence that the
 costs per unit of output decrease rapidly at a rate proportional to
 the doubling of the output.1
 Energy industries and energy systems are not exceptional. This
 essay will demonstrate that large secular decreases in energy re
 quirements per unit of economic output have been achieved through
 out the world, as we have learned better how to make, operate,
 and use energy systems. Furthermore, the emissions of carbon
 dioxide from energy systems, coming from the combustion of the
 carbon molecules that wood, coal, oil, and gas all contain, have
 also decreased per unit of energy consumed. This decarbonization
 of the energy system proves to be emblematic of its entire evolu
 tion.
 At the same time, because of population and general economic
 growth, absolute world consumption of energy (and many other
 resources) has increased, especially in the more industrialized coun
 tries. This absolute growth often dominates environmental news
 and views. Rising carbon dioxide emissions are the main contribu
 tor to fears of global climatic change. This and other environmen
 tal concerns associated with carbon makes energy free from car
 bon a highly desirable goal for the energy system. The fact that
 energy and most of the other factor inputs have decreased per unit
 of output over long periods of time provides a fresh basis on which
 to project the range of possible future resource use and emissions.
 A glance at the changes in labor and materials requirements
 helps to establish the context and the pervasiveness of the phe
 nomenon that we will observe most closely in energy. Since 1860,
 the number of hours that workers in the industrialized countries
 are engaged in paid work each year has generally decreased by half
 {Figure 1). Though the Japanese bucked the trend for several
 decades around mid-century and continue to work more than their
 European and American counterparts, they too are working less.
 Taking into account the dramatic increase in individual income
 and consumption over the period, we know that the labor require
 ments per unit of income and output decreased much faster than
 the number of hours worked. Furthermore, because life expec
 tancy increased by several decades during this period, the years of
 paid work required to sustain lifelong consumption for a worker
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 Figure 1. Annual Working Hours in Five Industrialized Countries from
 1860 to 1990, expressed in total working hours per year.
 Note: Hours spent on sick leave, strikes, and holidays are subtracted from the formal
 working time.
 Sources: Angus Maddison, Dynamic Forces in Capitalist Development: A Long-Run
 Comparative View (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); and Jesse H. Ausubel and
 Arnulf Gr?bler, "Working Less and Living Longer: Long-Term Trends in Working Time
 and Time Budgets," Technological Forecasting and Social Change 50 (1995): 113-131.
 at prevailing levels decreased from about three-quarters of a life
 time to less than one-half.2
 Decreases in requirements for many materials are similarly dra
 matic.3 For example, in the United States, which is quite represen
 tative of industrialized countries in this regard, steel use declined
 from about 70 kilograms per $1,000 of GNP (in 1983 dollars) in
 1920 to about one-third that level in recent years; cement per GNP
 in the United States has dropped by about half since I960.4 How
 ever, this dematerialization of the economy is varied. In some
 cases, a lighter steel beam does the work of an earlier, heavier one.
 In other cases, new materials replace the steel. In contrast, demand
 per GNP has grown steeply since mid-century for certain petro
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 chemicals (such as ethylene) and for advanced composite materi
 als. Requirements for paper per GNP have been rather flat since
 about 1930.
 Analysis of energy materials and decarbonization may in prac
 tice shed light on the question of dematerialization. Because en
 ergy is one of the most important factor inputs and is embedded in
 most materials, products, and services, decreases in specific energy
 requirements can also decrease the intensity of materials use. The
 carbon content of energy and the subsequent carbon dioxide emis
 sions form the largest single mass flow associated with human
 activities, excepting water. Current annual global carbon emis
 sions are about 6 billion tons, or more than 1,000 kilograms per
 person on the planet. In comparison, the global steel industry
 annually produces about 700 million tons, or about 120 kilograms
 per person. Therefore, decarbonization can contribute in a large
 way to dematerialization.
 Let us now turn to energy and examine the savings of carbon
 that have been obtained, why they may have occurred, and whether
 future savings may be sufficient to spare the environment some
 unwanted heat.
 THE GLOBAL HISTORY OF ENERGY AND CARBON SAVINGS
 To form a picture of carbon use, we need to be able to sum and
 compare its appearances. One way is to index carbon by the ratio
 of carbon atoms to hydrogen atoms in the energy sources that
 contain both of these fuels. Fuelwood has the highest effective
 carbon content, with about ten carbon atoms per hydrogen atom.
 If consumed without a compensating growth of biomass, which
 occurred in the past and still occurs in most developing countries,
 fuelwood thus produces higher carbon emissions than any of the
 fossil energy forms. Among fossil energy sources, coal has the
 highest carbon-to-hydrogen ratio, roughly one to one. Oil has on
 average one carbon for every two hydrogen atoms, and natural
 gas, or methane, has a ratio of one to four. Using these types of
 elemental analyses, we can estimate the total amount of carbon
 contained in a given supply of an individual fuel or a mix of fuels
 and compare this amount to energy consumed or associated eco
 nomic output.
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 Decarbonization can then be expressed as a product of two
 factors: 1) carbon emissions per unit of energy consumption; and
 2) energy requirements per unit of value added, which is often
 called energy intensity. Available data allow us to assess with
 reasonable confidence the trend for each of these factors since the
 nineteenth century for major energy-consuming regions and coun
 tries, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, and thus
 for the world as a whole as well. As Figure 2 shows, the ratio of
 carbon emissions per unit of primary energy consumed globally
 has fallen by about 0.3 percent per year since 1860. The ratio has
 decreased because high-carbon fuels, such as wood and coal, have
 been continuously replaced by those with lower carbon content,
 such as gas, and also in recent decades by nuclear energy from
 uranium and hydropower, which contain no carbon.
 The historical rate of decrease in energy intensity per unit of
 value appears to have averaged about 1 percent per year since the
 mid-nineteenth century and about 2 percent per year in some
 countries since the 1970s. The overall tendency is toward lower
 Figure 2. Carbon Intensity of Global Energy Consumption, expressed in
 tons of carbon per ton of oil equivalent energy (tC/toe).
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 energy intensities, although paths of energy development in differ
 ent countries have varied enormously and rather consistently over
 long periods (Figure 3). For example, France and Japan have
 always used energy more sparingly than the United States, the
 United Kingdom, or Germany. In some of the rapidly industrializ
 ing countries, such as China or Nigeria, commercial energy inten
 sity is still increasing. Because commercial energy replaces tradi
 tional energy forms not sold in the markets whose transactions
 find their way into national statistical data, total energy intensity
 may diminish while commercial energy intensity increases. The
 present energy intensity of Thailand resembles the situation in the
 United States in the late 1940s. The energy intensity of India and
 its present improvement rates are similar to those of the United
 States about a century ago.
 Figure 3. Primary Energy Intensity, including biomass, per unit of value
 added from 1855 to 1990, expressed in kilogram of oil equivalent
 energy per constant GDP in 1990 US dollars (kgoe/US$1990).
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 Combining the two factors of carbon intensity and energy inten
 sity (Figure 4) reveals the large differences in the policies and
 structures of energy systems among countries. For example, though
 Japan and France have both achieved high degrees of
 decarbonization, they have followed disparate routes. At the glo
 bal level, the long-term overall reduction in carbon intensity per
 unit of value from both factors totals about 1.3 percent per year
 since the mid-1800s.
 The major determinants of energy-related carbon emissions can
 be represented as multiplicative factors in a simple equation. Plac
 ing carbon emissions on one side, on the other we have population
 growth, per capita value added, energy consumption per unit of
 Figure 4. Global Decarbonization by Carbon and Energy Sparing from
 1870 to 1988, expressed in kilograms of carbon per kilogram of oil
 equivalent energy (kgC/kgoe) and in kilograms of oil equivalent energy
 per $1,000 of GDP in constant 1985 dollars.
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 value added, and carbon emissions per unit of energy consumed.5
 As we have seen, the last two terms in this equation are decreasing
 globally. However, their decline is counteracted by rising values
 for the preceding terms, population and economic activity, result
 ing in an overall global increase in energy consumption and car
 bon emissions.
 The world's global population is currently increasing at a rate of
 about 1.6 percent per year. The longer-term population growth
 rate since 1800 has been about 1 percent per year. Most popula
 tion experts predict at least another doubling during the next
 century.6 Economic activity has been increasing in excess of global
 population growth since the beginning of industrialization, made
 possible by the productivity increases referred to at the outset of
 this essay. In recent decades global economic growth, stirred by
 both population and productivity gains, has proceeded at about 3
 percent per year. Subtracting 1.3 percent for decarbonization, the
 result is that global carbon emissions have been increasing at
 about 1.7 percent per year. A continuation would imply a dou
 bling of emissions in about forty years. Fearing such an increase,
 we must examine in detail the differing paths to decarbonization
 to see what the limits of the process might be.
 DECONSTRUCTING DECARBONIZATION
 An examination of five countries?China, France, India, Japan,
 and the United States?furthers our understanding of the
 decarbonization process.7 These countries represent diverse eco
 nomic and energy systems and life-styles as well as a significant
 share of the world's energy use. The United States has one of the
 highest energy intensities of all the industrialized countries, and
 the highest per capita energy consumption in the world. France
 and Japan have among the lowest energy intensities in the world,
 but for different reasons, as we shall discuss. China and India are
 rapidly developing and still replacing traditional energy sources
 with commercial ones, and thus they exhibit very high energy and
 carbon intensities. Together, the five countries account for about
 45 percent of global primary energy consumption and more than
 40 percent of energy-related carbon emissions.
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 To determine more precisely the various causes and determi
 nants of the decreasing carbon intensity of energy, we disaggregate
 the energy system into its three major constituents: primary en
 ergy consumption, energy conversion, and final energy consump
 tion. Primary energy consumption embraces the requirement for
 original resources such as coal, crude oil, and uranium. Final
 energy refers to the gasoline pumped into a car's fuel tank, the
 electricity for powering a room air conditioner, or firewood if used
 directly for cooking or heating. Primary energy, such as coal, is
 rarely consumed in its original form in a household or office but
 rather is converted into electricity, fuel, and heat. Thus, final
 energy, which is consumed directly, in some sense represents best
 the actual energy requirements of the economy and individual
 consumers.
 In fact, neither primary energy consumption nor conversion is
 transparent to consumers. For example, the production process for
 electricity is invisible to most consumers. Because electricity itself
 is carbon-free, it does not emit carbon (or soot, sulfur dioxide, and
 other pollutants) at the point of consumption. However, carbon
 can be emitted in converting primary energy forms into electricity.
 To a lesser degree this is also true of other forms of final energy,
 such as oil products. Although the carbon emissions per liter of
 diesel or gasoline finally used in a truck are basically the same
 throughout the world, the carbon emissions produced in convert
 ing different grades of crude oil into the two products can vary
 substantially.
 To deconstruct the constituent decarbonization rates of the en
 ergy system, we make three assumptions. First, the carbon inten
 sity of primary energy is defined as the ratio of the total carbon
 content of primary fuels to total primary energy consumption for
 a given country. Second, the carbon intensity of final energy is
 defined as the carbon content of all forms of final energy divided
 by the total final energy consumption. The third assumption is
 that the carbon intensity of energy conversion is the difference
 between the two intensities just described. So, for example, the
 carbon intensity of primary energy runs high when wood and coal
 supply most of the fuel. The carbon intensity of conversion runs
 high when coal burns to make most of the electricity and when the
 conversion (or transmission and distribution) system itself is wasteful.
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 Efficiency improvements in the energy system mean that less pri
 mary energy is consumed per unit of final energy; lower conver
 sion losses therefore result in lower carbon emissions. The carbon
 intensity of consumption runs high when the final consumer cooks
 with coal or travels by gasoline and when end-use devices are
 inefficient.
 Let us now compare the carbon intensities of final, primary, and
 conversion energy for the United States, Japan, France, China, and
 India in recent decades (Figures 5 through 7). Steady reductions in
 the carbon intensity of final energy in all five countries stand out
 above all. On average, the three industrialized countries have
 spared about 20 percent since 1960, while the pair of developing
 countries have cut back about 15 percent since the early 1970s.
 The reductions converge tightly in the three industrialized coun
 tries. The gap between the developed and the developing countries
 is also slowly narrowing because of the slightly more rapid de
 clines in intensity in the latter.
 Figure 5. Carbon Intensities of Final Energy, expressed in tons of
 carbon per ton of oil equivalent energy (tC/toe).
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 Figure 6. Carbon Intensities of Primary Energy, expressed in tons of
 carbon per ton of oil equivalent energy (tC/toe).
 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
 Year
 Figure 7. Carbon Intensities of Energy Conversion, expressed in tons of
 carbon per ton of oil equivalent energy (tC/toe).
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 The major reason for the decarbonization of final energy is the
 increasing share of electricity in final energy throughout the world.
 The percentage of global primary energy used to create electricity
 has climbed during this century from 5 in the year 1910 to 20 in
 1950 to about 35 in 1990. A second reason is that the average mix
 of other fuels consumed for final energy has a decreasing carbon
 content, that is, greater shares of oil products and natural gas.
 Accordingly, these products also have a higher hydrogen content,
 a point that will be discussed in the final section of this essay.
 The carbon intensity of primary energy has also fallen in all five
 countries, though only very slightly in the United States, where
 coal has retained its strong role. The carbon intensities of conver
 sion give a completely different picture, however. The diversity in
 the development and structure of the energy systems of the five
 countries becomes apparent. In the developing countries, the car
 bon intensity of conversion has increased, while in France it dropped
 sharply; in the United States and Japan the conversion intensity
 initially rose before declining during the latter part of the period
 analyzed.
 Should China and India continue to rely heavily on coal as their
 primary source of energy, continuing to lessen the carbon intensity
 of primary energy in these countries will prove difficult. In fact,
 sometime in the next century the downward trend in the carbon
 intensity of primary energy could reverse itself, caused by an even
 higher share of electricity in end use but generated with coal.
 Alternatively, China and India could restructure their energy sys
 tems to make increasing use of natural gas or nuclear energy and
 other zero-carbon options. Such shifts would align their energy
 systems with those of the more industrialized countries.
 Focusing on the United States and Japan, we see that the carbon
 intensity of primary energy exceeds that of final energy, with
 conversion intensity the highest of the three. While final carbon
 intensity decreases somewhat faster in Japan (about 0.8 percent
 per year) than the United States (about 0.5 percent per year), the
 difference in the conversion intensities is much more dramatic. In
 both countries the changes in the carbon intensity of energy con
 version are erratic, especially compared to the steady improve
 ments in final intensities. The overall reduction of carbon intensity
 in Japan stems primarily from improvements in energy efficiency
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 and, to a lesser degree, from the replacement of carbon-intensive
 energy forms.
 France provides a contrast. Here, the rapid introduction of
 nuclear energy since the mid-1970s has led to higher rates of
 decarbonization of primary energy and of conversion (because an
 increasing share of electricity is produced without carbon emis
 sions) than of final energy. This strategy to achieve low carbon
 emissions is completely internal to the energy system and funda
 mentally decoupled from the consumer. Nevertheless, the rela
 tively smooth improvement in final carbon intensity is similar to
 that observed in Japan and the United States.
 China and India present a different picture, though they re
 semble one another. The three energy ratios and their evolution
 are similar in these countries despite their many social and cultural
 differences, as well as those differences that may be attributed to
 the varying development paths of planned and market economies.
 In both countries, the carbon intensity of primary energy is dimin
 ishing slightly. The carbon intensity of final energy, on the other
 hand, decreases at rates comparable to those observed in industri
 alized countries. In India, the faster decarbonization of final en
 ergy is due to the replacement of traditional fuels by commercial
 energy forms. For example, the use of biomass (mainly wood that
 is not replaced by a new forest) is more carbon intensive than
 using either kerosene or bottled gas. The difference in carbon
 intensity between electric lighting (especially if efficient light bulbs
 are used) and traditional illumination is even more pronounced. In
 any case, the developing economies are undergoing basically the
 same process of decarbonizing final energy use as the most devel
 oped countries.
 In the industrialized countries, the decarbonization of final en
 ergy consumption has been accompanied by additional structural
 changes in the energy system. These led to improvements in
 decarbonization in the energy system itself, as demonstrated by the
 downward trends in the carbon intensity of conversion. In con
 trast, China and India have not undergone this transition. Their
 energy systems depend heavily on coal, whereas most industrial
 ized countries have in large measure replaced coal with less car
 bon-intensive sources, even in electricity production. As a conse
 quence of their dependence on coal, both China and India show
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 rapid increases in the carbon intensity of conversion. Should a
 transition to a lower carbon intensity in developing countries not
 occur in the coming decades, the likely reductions in carbon emis
 sions in the industrialized countries will be offset, hampering ef
 forts to halt the global increase in carbon emissions.
 In sum, determining decarbonization only as the ratio of total
 carbon emissions per unit of primary energy consumption may veil
 the interaction between the energy system and the economy. As
 the structure of an energy system changes, so does the carbon
 intensity of its three constituent parts. The actual forms of final
 energy demanded and consumed matter greatly in the logic of
 decarbonization. Because electricity and heat contain no carbon,
 the carbon intensity of final energy is generally lower than the
 carbon intensity of primary energy. In addition, its rate of decrease
 exceeds that of primary energy because of the increasing share of
 electricity and other fuels with lower carbon content, such as
 natural gas, in the final energy mix. At the level of final energy,
 decarbonization is a durable, pervasive phenomenon. The likely
 explanation is a congruence in consumer behavior and preferences
 as expressed in the structure of final energy over a wide range of
 income and developmental levels.
 THE ELEMENTAL EVOLUTION
 We have seen the increasing needs for electricity and hydrogen
 rich forms of final energy. Can these be reconciled with the rela
 tively slow and often opposing changes in the structure of energy
 systems and the primary energy supply? The historical replace
 ment of coal by oil, and later by natural gas, at the global level
 shows the way. The well-documented evolutionary substitution of
 sources of primary energy suggests that natural gas and later
 carbon-free energy forms will become the leading sources of pri
 mary energy globally during the next century.8
 The competitive struggle between the five main sources of pri
 mary energy?wood, coal, oil, gas, and nuclear?has proven to be
 a dynamic and regular process that can be described by relatively
 simple rules. A glance reveals the dominance of coal as the major
 energy source between the 1880s and the 1960s after a long period
 during which fuelwood and other traditional energy sources led
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 (Figure 8). The mature coal economy meshed with the massive
 expansion of railroads and steamship lines, the growth of steel
 making, and the electrification of factories. During the 1960s, oil
 assumed a dominant role in conjunction with the development of
 automotive transport, the petrochemical industry, and markets for
 home heating oil.
 The model of energy substitution projects natural gas (methane)
 to be the dominant source of energy during the first decades of the
 next century, although oil should maintain the second largest
 share until the 2020s. Such an exploratory look requires addi
 tional assumptions to describe the later competition of potential
 new energy sources such as nuclear, solar, and other renewables
 that have not yet captured sufficient market shares to allow reli
 Figure 8. Global Primary Energy Substitution from 1860 to 1982 and
 Projections for the Future, expressed in fractional market shares (F).
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 able estimation of their penetration rates. In Figure 8 it is assumed
 that nuclear energy will diffuse at rates comparable to those at
 which oil and natural gas diffused half a century earlier. Such a
 scenario would require a new generation of nuclear installations;
 today such prospects are at best questionable. This leaves natural
 gas with the largest share of primary energy for at least the next
 fifty years. In the past, new sources of energy have emerged from
 time to time, coinciding with the saturation and subsequent de
 cline of the dominant competitor. In Figure 8, "Solfus" represents
 a major carbon-free energy technology, such as solar or fusion,
 that could emerge during the 2020s at the time when natural gas
 is expected to reach the limits of its market niche.
 The unfolding of primary energy substitution implies a gradual
 continuation of energy decarbonization globally. Figure 9 shows
 how the ratio of hydrogen to carbon atoms in the world fuel mix
 has changed as a result of primary energy substitution. If natural
 gas becomes the dominant source of energy, this ratio can be
 expected to approach the level of four hydrogen atoms to one
 carbon. Improvements beyond this level would have to be achieved
 by the introduction of noncarbon energy sources and by the sus
 tainable use of biomass.
 A methane economy offers a bridge to the noncarbon energy
 future consistent with both the dynamics of primary energy substi
 tution and the steadily decreasing carbon intensity of final energy.
 As nonfossil energy sources are introduced into the primary energy
 mix, new energy conversion systems would be required to provide
 zero-carbon carriers of energy in addition to electricity. The ideal
 candidate is pure hydrogen, used as a gas or liquid. Hydrogen and
 electricity could carry virtually pollution-free and environmentally
 benign energy to end users in a carbon-free energy system.
 To the extent that both hydrogen and electricity might be pro
 duced from methane, the carbon separated as a by-product could
 be contained and stored, probably in underground caverns. As the
 methane contribution to the global energy supply reaches its limit
 and subsequently declines, carbon-free sources of energy would
 take over, eliminating the need for carbon handling and storage.
 This would conclude the global trend toward decarbonization and
 the resulting major transformation of the industrial ecosystem.
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 Figure 9. Ratio of Hydrogen (H) to Carbon (C) for Global Primary
 Energy Consumption since 1860 and Projections for the Future,
 expressed as a ratio of Hydrogen to Carbon (H/C).
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 The emergent system could accommodate cleanly the foreseeable
 levels of population and economic activity.
 In fact, an energy system of the distant future that relies on
 electricity and hydrogen as the complementary energy carriers
 would also advance dematerialization. Hydrogen has the lowest
 mass of all atoms, and its use would radically reduce the total mass
 flow associated with energy activities and the resulting emissions.
 Electricity is free of material emissions, and the only product of
 appropriate hydrogen combustion is water. Thus, decarbonization
 not only contributes to dematerialization but is also consistent
 with the emergence of new technologies that hold the promise of
 high flexibility, productivity, and environmental compatibility.
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 Weighty carbon is a poor match for the evolving final energy
 demands of modern societies. Fortunately, decarbonization has
 asserted itself already as a widespread, long-term development
 driven by deepening, strengthening forces.
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